In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991) . Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons.
Introduction
The notion of the equity core of a transferable utility coalitional game (a game, for short) was introduced by Selten (1978) as a weighted generalization of the equal division core (Selten, 1972) . There are in the literature two main explanations for the equal division core. On one hand, Selten (1972) used this solution concept to explain outcomes of experimental cooperative games showing that the evidence suggests that equity considerations have a strong influence on observed payoff divisions. On the other hand, a much more theoretical approach is given by Dutta and Ray (1991) when they propose a solution which combines commitment for egalitarianism and selfish behavior. In that paper, the authors introduce the strong constrained egalitarian solution and show that this solution concept selects the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core. They also prove non-emptiness for N-superadditive games, a weaker condition than superadditivity. However, as far as we know, there is not a characterization for the existence of this solution. Moreover, in general, it is not immediate to find the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core of a game. Thus, the aim of the paper is twofold: characterize the existence of the equity core, which, in the particular case where all players have the same weight, gives a characterization of the existence of the equal division core, and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core. Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite collection of polyhedrons.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce preliminaries and notation. Section 3 contains the decomposition theorem and the non-emptiness characterization result for the equity core. Section 4 provides a systematic method for computing the Lorenzmaximal allocations in the equal division core.
Preliminaries
The set of natural numbers N denotes the universe of potential players. By N ⊆ N we denote a finite set of players, in general N = {1, . . . , n}. A transferable utility coalitional game (a game) is a pair (N, v) where v : 2 N −→ R is the characteristic function with v(∅) = 0 and 2 N denotes the set of all subsets (coalitions) of N . We use S ⊂ T to indicate strict inclusion, that is S ⊆ T but S = T . By |S| we denote the cardinality of the coalition S ⊆ N . The set of all games is denoted by Γ. Given a coalition S ⊂ N, S = ∅ and (N, v) ∈ Γ, we define the subgame (S, v S ) by v S (Q) := v(Q), for all Q ⊆ S.
Let R N stand for the space of real-valued vectors indexed by N , x = (x i ) i∈N , and for all S ⊆ N , x(S) = i∈S x i , with the convention x(∅) = 0. For each x ∈ R N and T ⊆ N , x T denotes the restriction of x to T : x T = (x i ) i∈T ∈ R T . Given two vectors x, y ∈ R N , x ≥ y denotes that x i ≥ y i , for all i ∈ N , and x > y denotes that x i > y i for all i ∈ N . In addition, we define R N + := {x ∈ R N | x ≥ 0} and R N ++ := {x ∈ R N | x > 0}. By z = max{x, y}, we denote the vector z ∈ R N such that z i = max{x i , y i }, for all i ∈ N .
The pre-imputation set of a game (N, v) is defined by X(N, v) :
A solution on a set Γ of games is a mapping σ which associates with any game (N, v) a subset σ(N, v) of the set X(N, v). Notice that the solution set σ(N, v) is allowed to be empty. For a game (N, v), the set of imputations is given by
The core of a game (N, v) is the set of those imputations where each coalition gets at least its worth, that is C(N, v) := {x ∈ X(N, v) | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N }. The equal division core (Selten, 1972) is an extension of the core containing those imputations which can not be improved upon by the equal division allocation of any subcoalition.
For any x ∈ R N , denote byx = (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) the vector obtained by rearranging from 2 x its coordinates in a non-decreasing order, that is,x 1 ≤x 2 ≤ . . . ≤x n . For any two vectors y, x ∈ R N , we say that y Lorenz-dominates x, (y ≻ L x), if k j=1ŷ j ≥ k j=1x j , for every k = 1, . . . , n, with at least one strict inequality. Given a coalition ∅ = S ⊆ N and a set A ⊆ R S , E(A) denotes the set of allocations that are Lorenz undominated within A. Given a game (N, v), the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core is the set E(EDC(N, v)) := {x ∈ EDC(N, v) | there is no y ∈ EDC(N, v) such that y ≻ L x}, which coincides with the set of strong constrained egalitarian allocations introduced by Dutta and Ray (1991) .
A game with a non-empty core is called balanced.
Dutta and Ray (1989) define the weak constrained egalitarian solution, denoted by DR(·), and show that on the domain of convex games this solution picks the payoff vector that is obtained by the following algorithm: Let (N, v) be a convex game and DR(N, v) = {z}.
Step 1: Define v 1 = v. Then find the unique coalition S 1 ⊆ N such that for all S ⊆ N , (i)
|S| , and (ii) if
|S| and S = S 1 , then |S 1 | > |S|. Uniqueness of such a coalition is guaranteed by convexity of (N, v). Then, for all i ∈ S 1 , z i =
The uniqueness of such a coalition is guaranteed by the convexity of (
An ordering θ = (i 1 , . . . , i n ) of N , where |N | = n, is a bijection from {1, . . . , n} to N . We denote by S N the set of all orderings of N . Given a game (N, v) and an ordering θ = (i 1 , . . . , i n ) ∈ S N , we define the marginal worth vector associated to θ as the vector m θ (v) ∈ R N which assigns to each player her marginal contribution in the order θ. Formally,
Decomposition theorem and existence
In this section, we show that the equity core can be decomposed as the union of a finite collection of polyhedrons. Making use of this decomposition result, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core. The equity core is an asymmetric extension of the equal division core in which players may have different weights. Formally, given a vector of weights w ∈ R N ++ , the equity core w.r.t. w is defined as follows:
Since the equity core is a compact extension of the core, balancedness gives a first condition to guarantee non-emptiness (Bondareva, 1963 and Shapley, 1967) . However, the equity core can be non-empty even if the core is empty. Indeed, consider the following three-player game: v({i}) = 0, for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and v(S) = 1, otherwise. It is not difficult to see that for w = (1, 1, 1), EC w (N, v) = EDC(N, v) = {(0.5, 0.5, 0), (0.5, 0, 0.5), (0, 0.5, 0.5)} and the core is empty.
As we have commented before, for N -superadditive games both the strong constrained egalitarian solution and the equal division core are non-empty. Next we show that Nsuperadditivity is sufficient to guarantee non-emptiness of the equity core.
where
Define the vector x ∈ R N as follows:
Next we prove that the vectorx = (
Efficiency follows from the definition of the vector x taking into account that x(B j ) = v(B j ), for all j = 1, . . . , m. By N -superadditivity,
The next example shows that the N -superadditivity is not necessary to guarantee nonemptiness of the equity core. 
Notice that at least one of the values must be lower or equal than 1, since otherwise we get a contradiction. Therefore, we have two possibilities: (a) (N, v) . Thus, for any vector of weights w ∈ R N ++ , the equity core is non-empty.
Our objective is now to characterize non-emptiness. To this end, first we show that the equity core can be decomposed as the union of simple polyhedrons. In order to find these polyhedrons we define the proportional share worth vectors.
Definition. Let (N, v) be a game, w ∈ R N ++ a vector of weights and θ = (i 1 , . . . , i n ) ∈ S N . We define the proportional share worth vector w.r.t. w and θ, denoted byx θ w (v) ∈ R N , as follows:
where To characterize non-emptiness we only need to work with an special kind of polyhedrons, those generated by the proportional share worth vectors associated to θ ∈ S N with δxθ w ≥ 0, and minimal with respect to the usual order in R N . Given a game (N, v), w ∈ R N ++ and θ ∈ S N such that δxθ w ≥ 0, it is easy to see that (2) ∆x
Lemma 3.3. Let (N, v) be a game, w ∈ R N ++ andx θ w (v),x θ ′ w (v) the proportional share worth vectors w.r.t. θ, θ ′ ∈ S N respectively, such that δxθ w ≥ 0, δx θ ′ w ≥ 0. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
Proof: The implication 1 → 2 follows straightforward from expression (2). Next we prove 2 → 1. Assuming ∆x
Finally, take j ∈ N and k = j, thenx θ ′ w,j (v) ≥x θ w,j (v), getting the result.
Definition. Let (N, v) be a game and w ∈ R N ++ . We define the set of minimal proportional share worth vectors as follows:
Now we have all the tools to state a decomposition theorem for the equity core in terms of the above polyhedrons. 
Proof: We first prove that
. Take x ∈ EC w (N, v). We construct a specific order θ ∈ S N such that x ≥x θ w (v). This order θ is generated by the following algorithm. We choose a coalition S 1 ∈ 2 N , S 1 = ∅, such that
w(C) . Having chosen S 1 , since x ∈ EC w (N, v), there exists a player i 1 such that
w i 2 . Following this process we obtain an ordering θ = (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ) ∈ S N such that
Since x ∈ X(N, v), from (3) it follows that δxθ w ≥ 0. Hence, from expression (2) we have
, we are finished. If not, we can find an order θ ′ such
To show the reverse inclusion, take x ∈ ∆x θ w (v), where ∆x θ w (v) is generated byx θ w (v) ∈ M w (v). Then, from expression (2), x ∈ X(N, v) and x ≥x θ w (v). Recall that for all θ = (i 1 , . . . , i n ) ∈ S N , the set {P i 1 , . . . , P in } as described in Definition 2 forms a partition of the set 2 N \ {∅} (see Remark 3.2). Now take S ∈ 2 N \ {∅} and i r ∈ S be the first player in S w.r.t. the ordering θ. Then, S ∈ P ir and so x ir ≥x θ w,ir (v) = max C∈P ir
w(S) w ir . Hence, we conclude that x ∈ EC w (N, v).
A direct consequence of Theorem 3.4 is a characterization of the non-emptiness of the equity core.
Theorem 3.5. Let (N, v) be a game and w ∈ R N ++ a vector of weights. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
There exists
As we have already mentioned, the equity core coincides with the equal division core when all the players have the same weight. Moreover, since the equal division core is a compact set, the non-emptiness is equivalent to the non-emptiness of the set E (EDC(N, v) ). Hence, as a consequence of the above theorem a characterization of the non-emptiness of both the equal division core and the E (EDC(N, v) ) is getting. 
Next, we give a four-player glove market game to illustrate the above decomposition result and to check the non-emptiness of the equal division core. 
As the reader may check, the set of minimal share worth vectors is M(v) = {x = (0.5, 0.5, 0, 0), y = (0, 0, 0.5, 0.5)}, and the equal division core is the union of the corresponding two polyhedrons, EDC(N, v) = ∆ x (v) ∪ ∆ y (v).
In Figure 1 we represent the core and the equal division core of this game in the efficiency hyperplane (of dimension 3). The equal division core corresponds to the two shadowed pyramides and the core is the discontinuous black segment. The set of Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core is the intersection point between the two pyramides, E(EDC(N, v)) = {(0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)}. 4 Finding the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core
In this section, we provide a systematic procedure for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core based on its geometrical decomposition as a finite union of polyhedrons. For this purpose we use the definitions and results stated in Section 3 when all players have the same weight.
To locate the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core it is enough to see that in each polyhedron ∆ x (v) there is a unique Lorenz-maximal element. As we prove in Lemma 4.1, this element is quite similar to the one reported by the constrained equal awards rule for bankruptcy problems (see Moulin, 2002 or Thomson, 2003 .
Definition. Let (N, v) be a game and x ∈ X * (N, v). The vector y x ∈ R N is defined as y x,i := max{x i , λ}, for all i ∈ N , where λ is chosen so as to satisfy j∈N max{x j , λ} = v(N ).
The next result states that y x Lorenz dominates every other element in the polyhedron ∆ x (v). is convex and C(N, v x ) = ∆ x (v). Thus, since for convex games the weak constrained egalitarian allocation Lorenz dominates every other point in the core (Dutta and Ray, 1989) , we must see that DR(N, v x ) = {y x }. Assume, without loss of generality,
. Otherwise, take k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, n ≥ 2, and define the vector
. Observe that y x = y k * , where k * = min{k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} | y k ≥ x}. Let P = {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m } be the partition of N obtained by means of the Dutta and Ray(1989) algorithm to compute the weak constrained egalitarian allocation of (N, v x ) and take DR(N, v x ) = {z}.
is, S 1 is formed by those players with the maximum payoff at x. Then, removing players of S 1 , coalition S 2 is formed in a similar way, and so on until the last but one element of the partition, S m−1 . Moreover, z i = x i , for all i ∈ S h and all h = 1, . . . , m − 1, and
, for all i ∈ S m . Hence, z = y k , where k = |S 1 ∪ . . . ∪ S m−1 |. Now suppose that k is not minimal and denote by k * = min{r ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} | y r ≥ x}. Then,
. By the minimality of k * , we have
Combining the above two lemmas, and taking into account the transitivity of the Lorenz relation, the next result follows straightforward. Notice that the set of Lorenz-maximal elements in a compact set is not generally finite (see, for instance, Example 4 in Dutta and Ray, 1989). N, v) ).
